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ACCIDENT RISK ASSESSMENT OF
SIMULTANEOUS CONVERGING INSTRUMENT APPROACHES
Henk A.P. Blom, Margriet B. Klompstra and Bert Bakker
ABSTRACT
With increasing traffic there often are environmental and economical reasons to optimise
Simultaneous Converging Instrument Approaches (SCIA) without sacrificing the high safety
levels realised in air traffic. One of the well known safety issues of SCIA is the risk of a mid air
collision due to a double missed approach. The aim of this paper is to show through a working
example that there is a clear advantage to evaluate the safety through support of advanced
accident risk assessment methodology. In this paper such methodology is applied to a specific
example of SCIA at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. Comparison of the obtained results against
FAA established SCIA criteria shows that there are situations in which these FAA criteria are
not met; however, the collision risk is not higher than for similar situations that would satisfy
these criteria. The implication for Amsterdam Airport Schiphol is that a specific change can be
introduced as being risk neutral. The implication for other busy airports with converging
runways might be that there is room to develop new or improved SCIA without compromising
safety.
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1 Introduction
Many airports in the world have converging runways. Due to increasing traffic, these airports
have environmental and economic incentives to allow for Simultaneous Converging Instrument
Approaches (SCIA) without compromising established safety levels. And if safe SCIA were not
feasible, then Dependent Converging Instrument Approaches (DCIA) are another option. One of
the well known safety issues of SCIA and DCIA is to safely manage a double missed approach
(MA). The basic studies on these safety management issues have been performed by MITRE;
first for SCIA [Newman et al., 1981; Weiss, 1986], and later for DCIA [Smith et al., 1992]. The
analysis used in these basic studies consists of a systematic “worst” case reasoning about MAs.
This might lead to safety conservative requirements on SCIA and on DCIA. The aim of the
current paper is to show through an example that the existing criteria of allowing SCIA indeed
may be relaxed by systematically exploiting an accident risk assessment modelling approach.
1.1 Existing SCIA criteria
Although ICAO provides criteria for simultaneous instrument operations on parallel or near
parallel runways [ICAO, 1988], these criteria do not address SCIA. The FAA, however, has
systematically developed SCIA criteria [FAA, 1993], which are often referred to as the
TERPS+3 criteria, and which come down to:
1. Non-intersecting straight-in final approach courses;
2. MA Points (MAPt’s), for latest yes/no landing decision, must be at least 3 nautical miles
apart;
3. Published MA paths diverge by at least 45 degrees and the associated primary TERPS
surfaces do not overlap;
4. ATC shall designate separation responsibility and procedures to be applied in the event of a
MA initiated beyond the MAPt;
5. ATC may establish higher weather minima than published to preclude, to the extent
feasible, the possibility of a weather related MA.
By McCartor et al. [1997], it has also been shown that properly equipped FMS aircraft that
execute a MA on the autopilot could do much better than criterion 3 requires. In line with this,
for a limited category of aircraft, criterion 3 has been tightened and criterion 2 has been replaced
by the requirement that the MAPt on the secondary runway should not be lower than 650 feet
[FAA, 1998].
For airports that frequently experience low ceiling conditions, the FAA criteria imply a serious
limitation in the effective exploitation of SCIA, and a similarly frequent limitation of airport
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capacity. Hence from an airport capacity point of view it would be very valuable to have an
approach that allows relaxation of the existing SCIA criteria, 2 and 3 in particular.
1.2 Example considered
The specific example considered in this paper is SCIA on runways 19R and 22 of Amsterdam
Airport Schiphol, the geometry of which is depicted in Figure 1. As explained below, for this
example TERPS+3 criteria 1, 2, 4 and 5 are satisfied, and 3 is not.
Runway 19R is one of Schiphol’s four main runways. It has its MAPt at 0.46 nautical miles
before the threshold (ILS height is 200 ft) and has a straight MA path, while runway 22 is a
secondary non-intersecting runway with its MAPt at 1 nautical mile before the threshold (ILS
height is 350 feet) and a MA path that is 63 degrees turning left [AIP, 2000]. The distance
between the two MAPt’s is 3.03 nmi; hence the first and second TERPS+3 criteria of [FAA,
1993] are satisfied. Since the MA paths diverge by 25° only, which is less than the required 45°,
the third TERPS+3 criterion is not satisfied. The 19R runway controller is prepared to instruct a
right turning MA to an aircraft on 19R if an aircraft on 22 makes a straight MA, which means
that the 4th TERPS+3 criterion is satisfied. Finally, allowance of SCIA on runways 19R and 22
is limited to conditions of relatively high headwind for runway 22, i.e. this falls within the 5th
TERPS+3 criterion.
x
38º
25º
y
RWY 19R
RWY 22
3.03Nm
North
ac i
ac j


MAPt 19R
MAPt 22
Figure 1 Geometry of runways 19R and 22 at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol and the AIP specified
missed approach paths.
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When runway 22 is in use the lowest forecasted broken-clouds-ceiling for selecting runway 22
as landing runway is 400ft. Frequent low broken-clouds-ceiling conditions at Amsterdam
Airport Schiphol invite a lowering of this selection criterion to 300 ft, and to do so the MAPt for
runway 22 should be shifted some 0.5 nmi towards the threshold. Then the distance between the
MAPt’s of runway 22 and 19R would become 2.86 nmi, which would mean that TERPS+3
criterion number 2 is no longer satisfied for SCIA on runways 22 and 19R. In order to
determine whether there exists a sound rationale for applying risk criteria numbers 2 and 3 to
this example, a risk assessment modelling study has been conducted following the approach of
[Blom et al., 2001a]. This modelling study is organised in two phases:
• Phase 1: to develop an initial risk assessment model that is able to make a relative
comparison of accident risks due to double MAs with the old and the new MAPt’s.
• Phase 2: to refine the risk assessment model such that it enables a comparison of the risk
due to double MAs with established accident risk criteria for en-route traffic.
1.3 Phase 1 study
During phase 1, relative accident risk assessments have been performed for two situations: one
with the MAPt for runway 22 at 1 nmi before the threshold, and the other with the MAPt shifted
0.5 nmi towards the threshold. As a result of this shift, the distance between the MAPt’s reduces
from 3.03 nmi to 2.86 nmi, the latter of which is below the 3 nmi of the 2nd TERPS+3 criterion.
The steps performed are:
• Identification of existing and new operations, including the relevant scenarios and the
associated hazards, both through brainstorms and interviews with experts, and through
making use of dedicated hazard and incident data bases.
• Development of the mathematical model, including model assumptions and assessment of
parameter values, and integration with the identified scenarios.
The key finding of phase 1 was that the developed model of the SCIA operation on 19R and 22
is risk neutral with respect to the proposed shifting of the MAPt for runway 22 towards its
threshold [Blom et al., 2001b]. The rationale for this finding is that in the model the largest
contribution to accident risk stems from a non-negligible probability that both aircraft follow a
straight MA path. This finding also implied that it would not improve safety to increase the MA
path turning angle for runway 22 such that the 3rd TERPS+3 criterion would be satisfied.
1.4 Phase 2 study
The aim of the phase 2 study is to refine the risk assessment model and subsequently compare
the double MA’s risk of conducting SCIA on runways 19R×22 against established collision risk
criteria. The steps performed are:
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• In order to allow for a significant reduction of the level of uncertainty in the assessed risk,
site-specific statistical data on MAs and their reasons has been collected in collaboration
with ATC the Netherlands.
• On the basis of this information, the accident risk assessment model and its assumptions
were further improved, and subsequently the modelled accident risk was evaluated.
• Subsequently, a bias and uncertainty analysis was performed, following a recently
developed approach [Everdij and Blom, 2002].
• Finally, the obtained accident risk results were compared against arisk criterion that is
derived from ICAO’s TLS for collision between en-route flying aircraft [ICAO, 1998].
1.5 Aim and organisation of this paper
This paper aims to present the phase 2 results and is organised as follows. First, an overview is
provided of the main probabilistic models collected during both phases for the Schiphol
example considered. Then an explanation shows how these probabilistic models are integrated
into a mathematical collision risk model. This is followed by a section that introduces the
specific Schiphol example scenarios that have been evaluated during phase 2, and gives the
accident risk results obtained for these scenarios. Finally a summary of findings and conclusions
is given both for the specific Schiphol example and for the TERPS+3 criteria for SCIA in
general.
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2 Modelling of missed approaches
One of the important steps required for the accident risk assessment is to develop probabilistic
models of MAs. The aim of this section is to explain the main issues covered by this modelling:
• Landing traffic flows
• MA frequencies
• MA initiation height
• MA climb behaviour
• Turn during MA
• Controller turn instruction
In addition to this, other probabilistic models have been adopted for issues such as aircraft speed
behaviour, wind conditions, and the size of the aircraft involved. Details are given in [Blom et
al., 2001d].
2.1 Landing traffic flows
Based on the evaluation of statistical data for the percentages of landing heavy/medium/light
aircraft on runways 19R and 22, the following percentages of arrival weight category, as shown
in Table 1, have been chosen for 19R and 22. This is referred to as Model assumption M.1.
The arrival spread over the weight classes is based on arrival trajectories reconstructed from
radar data over several one-month periods. This has shown that the uncertainty of assumption
M.1 is small.
Arrivals on 19R Arrivals on 22
Heavy 22% 0%
Medium 78% 85%
Light 0% 15%
Table 1 Arrival category percentages.
The traffic flow is assumed to be 30 arrivals per hour for each runway. This is referred to as
Model assumption M.37. Furthermore it is assumed that none of this traffic is equipped with
TCAS, and that no use is made of see-and-avoid. This is covered by Model assumptions M.15
and M.16 respectively.
2.2 Missed approach frequencies
During the first phase of the study there appeared to be significant uncertainty regarding the
frequencies of MAs [Blom et al., 2001b]. During the second phase of the study this problem has
been addressed through making use of the fact that since June 1995 tower controllers at
Schiphol have systematically been reporting MAs as part of the safety management process of
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ATC the Netherlands. This data set covering June 1995 through mid December 2000 has been
analysed in a statistical sense. The first analysis was directed towards the variety in reasons and
the percentages, the result of which is depicted in Table 2 for both uncommon and potentially
common causes.
Further analysis of the MA reports has shown that there were 21 reported double (or triple)
MAs within 4 minutes, from which 15 are subsequent MAs of aircraft that were approaching the
same runway under proper separation conditions. This leaves 6 double or triple MAs on
converging runways (all within 2 minutes):
• One coincidentally double MA (shorthand notation: Coinc)1,
• One double MA caused by Tower R/T down (shorthand notation: Tower),
• One triple MA and one double MA caused by severe Wind (shorthand notation: Wind),
• One triple MA caused by Meteo info down (shorthand notation: Meteo),
• One double MA caused by severe wind during Mixed mode operation, i.e. a departure in
between arrivals. In this case, severe wind initiated a MA for an arrival at one runway. In
response to this a departure aircraft on the other runway had to wait, and the subsequent
arrival aircraft on the same runway had to initiate a MA too (shorthand notation: Mixed).
It was also verified if any of these double or triple MAs had led to a critical incident; it turned
out that none of them had done so.
Besides the above mentioned causes for a double MA, also airport great Alert (i.e. closing the
airport e.g. because of a major fire) has been identified as a cause for a double MA (shorthand
notation: Alert).
On the basis of these statistical MA data, expert based estimates of relevant exposure
frequencies and MA reporting reliability, double MA frequencies have been estimated, they are
given in Table 3 and referred to as Model Assumption M.30a. Table 3 also gives the equations
that are used for this evaluation. SingleˆN = 10
6
 is the estimated number of landings at Schiphol
over the period considered, Singlenˆ = 1240, Towernˆ = 2, Windnˆ = 3.5, Meteonˆ = 2.5, Alertnˆ = 1 and
Mixednˆ = 2 are obtained as Bayesian estimates from the single, double and triple MA counts, and
Simultνˆ = 0.4 and Simult|Mixedνˆ = 0.025 are expert based exposure frequency estimates. The last
value shows that, during simultaneous landings, mixed mode operations were conducted in
exceptional cases only at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol.
                                                     
1
 Shorthand notation is used in mathematical symbols.
-11-
NLR-TP-2003-557
Reason Percentage
UNCOMMON CAUSES 59.8 %
Crew related 4.2 %
Misunderstood R/T
Wrong R/T frequency
Wrong approach charts
Cabin not ready
Unintended MA
0.7 %
1.3 %
0.3 %
1.5 %
0.5 %
Technical aircraft 25.5 %
Bird strike
Technical unknown
Technical various
Gear (door) problems
Flap problems
Autopilot / nav receiver
0.9 %
2.2 %
1.1 %
14.2 %
5.8 %
1.2 %
Unstable approach/landing 24.9 %
ILS failed
Wake turbulence
Unstable approach
Speed high
Altitude high
Ground Proximity Warning System alerts
0.4 %
1.1 %
5.7 %
1.7 %
13.5 %
2.6 %
Separation reasons 4.1 %
Lateral separation
TCAS
3.8 %
0.3%
Unknown 1.1%
Unknown 1.1 %
POTENTIALLY COMMON CAUSE 40.2 %
Late/no landing clearance 21.2 %
Blocked R/T, ATCo busy
Landing runway occupied by aircraft
Landing runway occupied by other
2.6 %
16.6 %
2.0 %
Weather 19.0 %
Visibility / Runway Visual Range / cloud
Wind (gust)
Wind shear
Lightning / showers
5.0 %
5.5 %
6.9 %
1.6 %
TOTAL 100%
Table 2 Percentages of controller reported reasons for initiation of a MA at Amsterdam Airport
Schiphol.
-12-
NLR-TP-2003-557
Single MA Singleρˆ = 
Single
Single
ˆ
ˆ
N
n
1.24 ⋅10-3
Coincidentally double MA Coincρˆ = ( )2Singleρˆ 0.15 ⋅10-5
Double MA and Tower R/T blocked Towerρˆ = 
SimultSingle2
1
Tower
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ν⋅N
n
1.0 ⋅10-5
Double MA and severe Wind Windρˆ  = 
SimultSingle2
1
Wind
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ν⋅N
n
1.75 ⋅10-5
Double MA and Meteo info down Meteoρˆ = 
SimultSingle2
1
Meteo
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ν⋅N
n
1.25 ⋅10-5
Double MA and great Alert Alertρˆ  = 
SimultSingle2
1
Alert
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ν⋅N
n
0.5 ⋅10-5
Double MA and Mixed mode operation Mixedρˆ = 
Simult|MixedSimultSingle2
1
Mixed
ˆˆ
ˆ
ˆ
νν ⋅⋅N
n
4.0 ⋅10-4
Table 3 Estimated MA frequencies and the equations used.
Due to the use of a Bayesian estimation approach a zero count leads to a non zero expectation
and the uncertainty in the estimated frequency values is also known. For all except mixed mode,
the 95% uncertainty interval for the frequency values goes a factor 1.5 up and a factor 1.5 down.
For mixed mode, this uncertainty interval is a factor (1.5)2 .
2.3 Missed approach initiation heights
Since the MA initiation heights in the Schiphol data set either were often not reported or not
well reported, use has been made of world-wide KLM pilot MA reports over the time period
September 1992 to May 1994 [Blom et al., 2001d]. This data provides an indication for the
reasons of initiating MAs, and their altitude and frequency of occurrence. Based on this data, a
histogram has been constructed of MA initiation heights. Subsequently, this histogram has been
fitted with a weighted sum of a Rayleigh density and a uniform density as depicted in Figure 2.
The probability density function of MA initiation height is a density fit of this histogram, which
is a weighted sum of Rayleigh density (60%) with mean 300ft and a Uniform density (40%).
This is referred to as Model assumption M.4.
It is also assumed that for each of the double MA causes in Table 3 only one of the following
two densities applies:
• The Rayleigh density for double MAs initiated due to Tower R/T blocked and due to severe
Wind.
-13-
NLR-TP-2003-557
• The uniform density for all other double MAs.
Since the histogram is based on the world-wide trip reports of one airline, there may be a
significant uncertainty level in the shape of the histogram, and thus in the fitted densities (60%
Rayleigh and 40% Uniform).
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Figure 2 Histogram of KLM pilot MA trip reports and of density fit, which is a weighted sum of a
Rayleigh density (60%) with mean 300ft and a Uniform density on 0-1200ft (40%).
2.4 Missed approach climb behaviour
Based on [ICAO-CRM, 1980], probabilistic models for the lateral deviations from nominal MA
paths are available; this is referred to as Model assumption M.6a. For vertical behaviour
during MA, ICAO-CRM provides a parabolic vertical path model for the change from descent
to climb, and then a model for minimum climb rate requirement only (2.5%). The parabolic
vertical path model has been adopted as Model assumption M.6c, and the minimal climb rate
requirement is used for 1% of the MA climbs to cover non-nominal climbs.
McCartor et al. [1997] provides histograms of simulated FMS-LNAV climb performance during
MAs. As a reasonable approximation of these densities, we assumed a Gaussian density with
mean value 10 m/s and standard deviation of 2 m/s for the other 99% MAs. This particular
combination of models is referred to as Model assumption M.5.
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The rate of climb is assumed to continue until the final MA altitude (of 2000ft) has been
reached; this is referred to as Model assumption M.18. In reality aircraft level off gradually on
autopilot, or may overshoot when levelling off without autopilot.
Once the final MA altitude has been reached it is assumed that for all aircraft weight categories
(heavy, medium and light), the vertical deviations at final MA altitude are assumed to be
Gaussian with standard deviation of 10 m. This is referred to as Model assumption M.6b. The
true standard deviation may be up to a factor 2 larger or smaller, and thus there is a significant
uncertainty2.
2.5 Turn during missed approach
Although in most cases a turn is made when it is prescribed by the AIP, there is a non-zero
probability αAIP that a pilot forgets to make a turn during the MA as prescribed in the AIP.
Assuming that the pilots are well aware of the AIP published MA path, (Model assumption
M.11), the expert-based estimated values for αAIP vary from 0.05 to 0.22, with 0.10 as best
estimate. The last value is referred to as Model assumption M.29.
Based on information collected from experienced (airline) pilots on various aircraft, it was
identified that the logical moment at which the pilot starts a turn during a MA is where the pilot
completes a well trained sequence of aircraft reconfiguration activities and the aircraft has
reached sufficient height. This expert knowledge has resulted in the development of
probabilistic models for the reconfiguration of an aircraft during MA, which are referred to as
Model assumption M.20, and the details of which are given for Boeing 737 and Airbus A320
in Table 4. A similar model has been identified for Boeing 767/300, Boeing 747, Fokker 50,
Cessna 172 and Swearingen Metro II [See Blom et al, 2001d].
In addition, Boeing 747 and 767/300 are assumed to be representative for the heavy category
aircraft, Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 are assumed to be representative for 50% of the medium
category aircraft, while the Fokker 50 is assumed to be representative for the other 50% of the
medium category aircraft. Swearingen Metro II and Cessna 172 are each assumed to be
representative for 50% of the light category aircraft.
                                                     
2
 At North Atlantic en-route levels the vertical deviation has a standard deviation of 24.9 m [ICAO-RGSCP, 1988, pp 1A-149]
and according to experts this deviation is lower at the final MA altitude.
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Task Starts at Duration Ends
50% 95% at
  1 T1 (= MA initiation point) 1 s 3 s T2
  2 T2 6 s 9 s T3
  3 T1 + 1 second 4 s 8 s T4
  4 T1 + 2 seconds 6 s 10 s T5
  5 T4 3 s 10 s T6
  6 T6 & passed 1000 ft 1300 ft 1600 ft T7
  7 T6 & passed 400 ft 600 ft 900 ft T8
  8 Passed altitude of 2000 ft – (10% of climb rate in fpm) 1700 ft 1900 ft T9
Table 4 Boeing 737 / Airbus A320 MA task breakdown. The tasks are: 1) Triggering MA flight
director mode, 2) Thrust change to MA thrust, 3) Adjusting pitch angle, 4) Raising flaps to climb-
out setting, 5) Raising the gear, 6) Engaging the autopilot, 7) Turn. Adjusting lateral navigation,
8) Level off, Adjusting vertical navigation.
2.6 Controller turn instructions
If aircraft on runways 22 and 19R both make a MA then the way of working is that the 19R
runway controller issues a preventive right turn instruction to the aircraft on 19R. It is assumed
that the controllers of runways 19R and 22 monitor aircraft well on initiating a MA and inform
each other immediately of such event. This is referred to as Model assumption M.10. It is
assumed that the controller of runway 22 does not issue a manoeuvre instruction (Model
assumption M.31). Subsequently the instruction by the 19R controller should reach the pilots
of aircraft on 19R. The chances to accomplish this vary significantly with the double MA
causing conditions. Expert estimates for the probability that a 19R controller is not successful in
letting the pilot on 19R make a right turn in case of a double MA are provided in Table 5. The
expected values are referred to as Model assumption M.30b.
Symbol Expected Max Min
αCoinc 0.15 0.30 0.05
αTower 0.50 0.99 0.25
αWind 0.15 0.30 0.05
αMeteo 0.05 0.10 0.02
αAlert 0.05 0.10 0.02
αMixed 0.05 0.10 0.02
Table 5 Expert estimated values for the probability that the 19R controller is not successful in
letting the aircraft on 19R make a right turn in case of a double MA.
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A properly received ATCo turn instruction is assumed to be implemented by the pilot
immediately upon completion of the reconfiguration activities. This is referred to as Model
assumption M.12. It is also assumed that this reception of such instruction from the controller
does not lead to any delay in the completion of the reconfiguration tasks (Model assumption
M.13).
In order to validate M.12, M.13 and M.20 to a reasonable extent, KLM has performed Boeing
737 flight simulator sessions with 21 different flight crews, in which a sudden runway non-
availability was simulated. Subsequently, during the late initiated MA a pseudo controller
suddenly issued a turn instruction. The observed moments of starting a turn agreed quite well
with the probabilistic model. It also became clear that during these simulator sessions, sharper
turns were realised than assumed in the model. In addition to this, Expert Judgement Interviews
have been held with five experienced TWR/APP Air Traffic Controllers.
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3 Mathematical modelling
3.1 Integration of mathematical models
For the integration of the mathematical models, the Dynamically Coloured Petri Net (DCPN)
approach is used [Everdij et al., 1997; Everdij and Blom, 2000]. During DCPN development,
use is made of a functional representation of ATM. The functional subsystems and their
interrelations are depicted in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 Functional representation of ATM.
For this particular risk assessment application it appeared to be sufficient to develop a Petri net
for the aircraft behaviour only. One such Petri net is necessary for each aircraft separately. This
Petri net is represented by the graph in Figure 4. This graph consists of four kinds of symbols:
 = place ;  = delaying transition ;  = immediate transition and arc. An arc either goes
from a place to a transition or vice versa. In this Petri net, the places correspond to physical
flight segments. The identified flight segments are determined by the following points: Outer
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Marker (OM), Minimum Radar Vectoring Altitude (MRVA), Touchdown (TD), Missed
Approach (MA) and Final MA Altitude (FMAA).
The dynamic status of the Petri net is shown through the appearance of one or more tokens in
places and a dynamic colour value connected to each token. In a DCPN, a token colour value
may evolve according to a (stochastic) differential equation, the characteristics of which depend
on the place of the token. The solution of such differential equation may for example represent
the aircraft state evolution.
MRVA-TD
Runway
Out of system
FMAA-END
Turn
MA-FMAA
Turn
FMAA-END
Straight
MA-FMAA
Straight
MA climb
MA reconfigura-
tion activities
MA reconfigura-
tion completed
T Reconf
T Height
T Turn
T TurnOM-MRVA
TMA
TFMAA
TFMAA
Till OM
Figure 4 Aircraft state evolution Petri net: detailed level. Drawn is a feasible two-token situation,
one token in place ‘MA reconfiguration activities’ and one token in place ‘FMAA-END Straight’.
Then the immediate transition to ‘FMAA-END Turn’ will fire as soon as the guard function of
TReconf evaluates to true.
The Petri net in Figure 4 has two immediate transitions: 1) To MA-FMAA turn, and 2) To
FMAA-END turn. These transitions are executed (fired) as soon as the transition is enabled (i.e.
there is a token in each place from which there is an arc). All other transitions are guard
transitions, which means that from the moment that the transition is enabled an additional
condition has to become true prior to the actual firing of the transition. Table 6 specifies these
guard transition delays.
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On the basis of such a DCPN specification it is rather straightforward to make a software
implementation to run Monte Carlo simulations. In theory, collision risk assessment is then a
matter of running Monte Carlo simulations and then counting the events at which aircraft shapes
physically start to overlap. In practice, this approach finds its limitation in the number of Monte
Carlo simulations that can be reasonably run within a few hours3. In order to improve on this,
stochastic analysis is used to decompose the collision risk in parts, each of which can be
assessed separately. In order to take maximal advantage of the particular encounter situation
under study and the statistical data available, the development of such a risk decomposition is
situation specific. Below, we outline how this is done for the double MA scenario, following
[Blom et al., 2001c].
Transition Guard function evaluates to True if:
To OM-MRVA Aircraft passes OM abeam
To MRVA-TD Aircraft passes MRVA
To Out of system Aircraft travelled 25km beyond threshold
TMA Aircraft reaches a randomly drawn altitude to start the MA.
THeight Pilot decides that aircraft has reached sufficient altitude to turn.
TReconf Aircraft reconfiguration activities are completed
TTurn The prescribed or instructed turn is completed
TFMAA Aircraft reaches final MA altitude
To runway Touch Down of aircraft
Table 6 Guard transitions in Figure 4.
3.2 Risk of collision between aircraft
Let yti := (yix,t , yiy,t , yiz,t )  and vti := (vix,t , viy,t , viz,t ) be the 3D location and 3D velocity of
aircraft i; the subscripts x and y refer to the axis system in Figure 1, and subscript z stands for
the height. Let ytij := yti  - ytj  be the distance between aircraft i approaching runway 19R and
aircraft j approaching runway 22 at time t and let vtij := vti -  vtj be the relative velocity of aircraft
i on runway 19R and aircraft  j on runway 22 at time t.
Define Dij as the collision area of  {ytij}, such that ytij ∈ Dij means that at moment t the physical
volumes of aircraft i and j are not separated anymore, i.e. they have collided. For aircraft
encounters on final MA altitude, the collision area Dij  is a rectangular box, defined as  [-dxij, dxij]
× [-dyij, dyij] × [ -dzij, dzij], with    2121
j
r
i
r
ij
r dd d +≡ and where the parameters dxi, dyi and dzi
represent x, y and z-direction sizes of aircraft i respectively. For aircraft encounters during MA
climb, the collision area  Dij  depends on the inclination angle of the aircraft.
                                                     
3
 With one million Monte Carlo runs, the assessed collision frequency is significant to the level of 10-5.
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It is possible that the process {ytij} enters the area Dij several times; each such occurrence is
called an incrossing. Each occurrence of the process {ytij} leaving the area Dij is called an
outcrossing. The first incrossing for aircraft pair (i,j) on runways 19R and 22 is a collision for
that pair. Hence, the incrossing rate is an upper bound for collision rate. ICAO collision risk
models are accustomed to use this upper bound [Hsu, 1981].
Following reference [Bakker and Blom, 1993], the risk of collision R between two aircraft is
expressed to be equal to a tight upper bound for the expected number of incrossings, between
one aircraft i and another aircraft j in an appropriate time-interval [0,T] as follows
∫= T ij dttR
0
)(ϕ (1)
where ϕij(t) is the incrossing rate between aircraft i and j, which is defined as
∆
∈∉
↓∆≡
∆+ ),(
0
lim)(
ijij
t
ijij
tij DyDyPtϕ (2)
From here on, in this paper time T is always chosen large enough such that the probability that
the aircraft pair (i,j) collides outside interval [0, T] is negligibly small.
3.3 Collision risk per approach
Now define R  as the probability that aircraft i and j make MAs on 19R and 22 respectively, and
both aircraft collide with each other. Also define stopping times τ i  and  τ ij  for aircraft i and the
pair ( i, j ) as
{ }
 ,inf       atMA  a initiatesAircraft titTi ≡τ
and
{ }jiij τττ ,max≡ .
From equation (1) and the definition of ijτ it follows that R   satisfies
∑∫=Σ
j
T
ij
ij
dttR
τ
ϕ )( (3)
where the summation is over all runway 22 aircraft j.
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3.4 Aircraft types and double missed approach causes
The event sequence classification process { }ijtκ  for an aircraft pair (i,j) consists of a local (i.e.
aircraft) related process and a common related process. Here, this process is defined as{ }Gtjiijt κκκκ ,,Col≡  , where κi and κj represent the aircraft types considered for aircraft i
and j respectively, and where the process { }Gtκ  , with GGt K∈κ , represents the specific MA
condition for both aircraft i and j. The set K G represents a set of double MAs due to various
reasons, i.e.
KG ≡ {Coinc, Tower, Wind, Alert, Meteo, Mixed}.
Now, we identify the value of { }ijtκ  at moment τ ij as a relevant event sequence class ijijτκ .
Hence { }Gjiij ijij ττ κκκκ ,,Col≡ .
Conditioning on event sequence class ijijτκ  and rearranging summation and integral yields
{ }∑ ∫∑
∈
Σ ==
j
T
ij
K
ij
ij
ij dttPR
τ
κ
κ
τ
ϕκκ )( (4)
where set K is defined as Gji KKKK ⊗⊗≡  with K i and K j the sets of aircraft types of
model assumption M.20 , for aircraft i and aircraft j respectively. Moreover, ϕκij(t)  is the ijijτκ
conditional incrossing rate between aircraft i and aircraft j, with aircraft i on one runway and
aircraft j on the other runway, which is defined as
∆
=∈∉
↓∆≡
∆+ ),(
0
lim)(
κκ
ϕ τκ
ijijij
t
ijij
tij ij
DyDyP
t
3.5 Decomposition over manoeuvre combinations
Through adopting some technical assumptions and a lengthy derivation it is possible to extend
the risk decomposition of equation (4) to MA manoeuvre combinations and to identify what the
summation over j means in terms of Monte Carlo simulations. The resulting set of equations is
[Blom et al., 2001c]:
∑
∈
Σ =
GG
G
K
RR
κ
κ (5)
),()()(ˆ 2219R2219R
19R19R 2222
wwwpwpR
GGGGG
Ww Ww κ
µρ
κκκκ
⋅⋅= ∑ ∑
∈ ∈
(6)
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with Wz the set of possible MA paths for runway z, and Gpκ and Gκµ satisfy
else)1(
ft 2000 &straight    if)(
else)1(
ft 2000 &straight    if)(
AIP
22AIP22
19R19R
α
α
α
α
κ
κ
κκ
−=
==
−=
==
wwp
wwp
G
G
GG
( ) ( ){ }
( )( ) 22R19,,,,
,,2)(
WWwwI
Pw
Gbaij
baji
K K
G ijijia jb
×∈⋅
=⋅= ∑ ∑
∈ ∈
κκκ
κκκκ
ττ
κ κκ
µ (7)
( ) ∫≡ T ijij
ij
dtwtwI
τ
κϕκ
 
),(,
with j such that (τ j - τ i ) has a uniform distribution on [-180s, 60s].
3.6 Decomposition of incrossing rate
Following [Bakker and Blom, 1993], the conditional incrossing rate satisfies
( ) ( )
( ) ij
r
ij
r
ij
r
ij
r
ij
rvy
ij
r
zyxr D
ij
r
ij
r
ij
r
ij
rvy
ij
r
ij
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tr
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(8)
where ( )wp ij
ij
ij
tr
ij
t vy
,|.|
,
κ
τ
κ
 is the conditional probability density function for the aircraft relative
position and velocity, Dr is equal to collision area Dij but without the r-th component, and yrij for
r = x,y,z is equal to the aircraft relative position without the r-th component.
Next, for an aircraft i and an aircraft j, stopping times τrij for r=x,y,z are defined as follows
{ }
    ;inf
,
ij
r
ij
tr
ijij
r dyt ≤≥≡ ττ
Together with (7) and (8) this implies
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3.7 Numerical evaluation of equations
To assess risk numerically, first equation (9) is evaluated. For each relevant (κ, w) the following
steps have to be performed:
• Monte Carlo simulation of double MAs on runways 19R×22.
• This yields histograms of simulated statistical information for the relative aircraft positions
and speeds, to which sums of Gaussian densities are fitted.
• Equation (9) is solved through analytical integration over ijrdv  and numerical integration
over 
ij
r
yd and  dt  respectively.
Next, the numerical results for ( )wI ij ,κ  are substituted into equation (7) and this into (6) and
(5), to yield a numerical value for R .
This numerical evaluation scheme has to be performed for each of the operational scenarios that
are presented next.
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4 Risk assessment of operational scenarios
In this section, the risk assessment model is used to evaluate several SCIA operational scenarios
for runway 19R×22. First, a series of operational scenarios is defined. Subsequently the risk
assessment is performed in a sequence of steps. Finally, a comparison is made against
established risk criteria.
4.1 Operational scenarios
The operational scenario variables identified for evaluation are:
• AIP published MA path for runway 19R: Straight MA path versus Right Turn MA path.
• Mixed mode operations, i.e. a departure in between two arrivals: Allowed versus Not
allowed.
• Instructions by runway controller: None versus Turn on 19R versus Extra climb on 19R.
In total this yields 12 combinations, of which the ones in Table 7 are selected for risk
assessment.
Operational scenario 19R MA in AIP ATCo instruction Mixed mode allowed
0 Straight MA on 19R None Yes
1 Straight MA on 19R Turn on 19R Yes
2 Straight MA on 19R None No
3 Straight MA on 19R Turn on 19R No
4 Straight MA on 19R Extra climb on 19R No
5 Turn MA on 19R None Yes
6 Turn MA on 19R None No
Table 7 Operational scenarios for risk assessment.
For each of these Operational scenarios in Table 7, the set of equations (5-9) has to be evaluated
in a numerical sense. This is organised in two steps:
• Assess conditional collision risks )(wGκµ using equations (7,9)
• Assess collision risk GRκ and ΣR  using equations (5,6)
During subsequent third and fourth steps, bias and uncertainty in the risk values is assessed
following [Everdij and Blom, 2002], and the bias and uncertainty corrected risk levels are
compared against established risk criteria. The results of these four steps are given in the
following four subsections.
-25-
NLR-TP-2003-557
4.2 Model based conditional collision risk
To evaluate equations (5) and (6) for the seven operational scenarios in Table 7, it appears that
theoretically there is need to assess the conditional collision risk )(wGκµ for 7×6×4(=168)
values of w . Practically, the effective number of w -values for which )(wGκµ has to be
evaluated is 12. These 12 combinations and the risk values )(wGκµ  assessed are given in Table
8.
w19R w22
Gκ ∈{Tower, Wind} Other Gκ
Straight Straight 2.9-3 2.9-3
Straight Left turn 3.7-8 2.4-8
Right turn Straight 4.1-8 2.5-8
Right turn Left turn 2.6-8 1.8-8
Straight & Extra climb Straight 1.2-5 1.1-5
Straight & Extra climb Left turn < 3.7-8 < 2.4-8
Table 8 Conditional collision risk values )(wGκµ for the w -values that are relevant to assess
the operational scenarios in Table 7.
To assess the conditional collision risks )(wGκµ  for each of the w -values in Table 8 according
to equation (7), there appeared to be 120 ( )w,κ combinations for which ( )wI ij ,κ   needed to be
numerically evaluated using (9).
As expected, all risk values of the Rayleigh PDF MA initiation height are higher than those for
the Uniform PDF MA initiation height; the only exception is formed by the risk values for both
aircraft making a straight MA. Also as expected is that the conditional collision risk values are
worst when both aircraft make a straight MA. However, these risk values are almost five orders
of magnitude worse than the risk values in case at least one of the aircraft makes a turn. The
implication is that as long as there is a small chance that both aircraft make straight MAs then
the conditional risk values at the top of Table 8 determine the total risk, and this is neutral
regarding the precise shape of the MA initiation height PDF. This corresponds with the key
finding of the phase 1 study [Blom et al., 2001b]. Another observation that can be made is that,
for the runway combination considered, a turn appears to be more effective than an extra climb
of 500 ft.
4.3 Model based collision risk
The next step in the assessment of collision risk is to evaluate equations (5) and (6) per scenario,
using the conditional collision risk values from Table 8 and the Gκρˆ , Gκα  and AIPα  values as
these have been estimated in the section on modelling of missed approaches, taking into account
the following specific sequence of adaptations:
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• No Mixed Mode allowed means: 0ˆ =Mixedρ
• Right turn MA on 19R in AIP means: replace Gκα by AIPα
• No ATCo instruction means: replace Gκα by 1
The resulting collision risk values are presented in Table 9. This shows that the model-based
total risks vary up to a factor of 100 with the scenario, with the Mixed Mode allowed scenario 0
having highest risk and scenarios 3, 4 and 6 having lowest risk. Before drawing further
conclusions it is better to assess bias and uncertainty in these risk values first.
Scenario 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
R
 Coinc 4.5-10 6.7-11 4.5-10 6.7-11 6.9-11 4.5-11 4.5-11
R
 Tower 2.9-09 1.5-09 2.9-09 1.5-09 1.5-09 2.9-10 2.9-10
R
 Wind 5.1-09 7.6-10 5.1-09 7.6-10 7.8-10 5.1-10 5.1-10
R
 Meteo 3.6-09 1.8-10 3.6-09 1.8-10 1.9-10 3.6-10 3.6-10
R
 Alert 1.5-09 7.3-11 1.5-09 7.3-11 7.8-11 1.5-10 1.5-10
R
 Mixed 1.2-07 5.8-09 0 0 0 1.2-08 0
R
 Σ 1.3-07 8.3-09 1.3-08 2.5-09 2.6-09 1.3-08 1.4-09
Table 9 Model based collision risks for SCIA on 19R×22.
Since the risk from double straight MAs provides the largest contributions, the values in Table 9
satisfy the following approximations:
),(ˆ StraightStraightR
GGG AIP κ
µαρ
κκ
⋅⋅≈ , scenarios 0, 2 and 6
       ),(ˆ StraightStraight
GGG AIP κ
µααρ
κκ
⋅⋅⋅≈ ,  scenarios 1, 3 and 4
       ),(ˆ StraightStraight
GG AIPAIP κ
µααρ
κ
⋅⋅⋅≈ , scenario 5
with
Gκ
ρˆ values from Table 3 (with 0ˆ =Mixedρ  for  scenarios 2, 3, 4, 6)
Gκ
α  values from the first column in Table 5
1.0=AIPα  (model assumption M.29)
),( StraightStraight
Gκ
µ = 2.9-3 (first row in Table 8)
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4.4 Bias and uncertainty assessment
The risk values in Table 9 apply to the mathematical model of the operational scenarios. Since
such a mathematical model differs from reality, one should expect that the model-based risk
differs from the true risk. The question then is to assess this difference in terms of bias and
uncertainty relative to the model based risk. Recently, Everdij and Blom [2002] have developed
a methodology to conservatively assess the bias and the 95% uncertainty band due to these
differences. To apply this methodology to the SCIA scenarios of Table 9, we first give the
equations of the total expected risk  *ΣR  :
{ } ΣΣ ⋅⋅= RCBR 81* exp (10)
with bias factor B and 95% uncertainty band (up and down) factor Cexp  satisfying:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )NPNOSmPSmOMPMOSPSOCPCO
NSmMSC
nnnnnnnnnn fffffB −−−−− ⋅⋅⋅⋅= (11)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )2NNU
2
SmSmU
2
MMU
2
SSU
2
CCU
ln
lnlnlnln
fn
fnfnfnfnC
⋅+
⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅= (12)
where nXY ≡ total number of XY valued model assumptions, with X ∈ {Considerable (C),
Significant (S), Minor (M), Small (Sm), Negligible (N)}, and with Y ∈ {Pessimistic (P),
Uncertain (U), Optimistic (O)}, and with factors
f
 C =  f M4 ≈  5.06
f
 S =  f M2 =  2.25
fM =  1.5
f
 Sm =  Mf ≈  1.2
fN =  Smf ≈  1.1
Here, pessimistic expected direction means that the modelled risk increases due to the
assumption (i.e. the expected risk will be smaller than the model based risk). Optimistic
expected direction means that the modelled risk reduces due to the assumption (i.e. the expected
risk will be larger). Uncertainty expected direction means that it is expected that the influence
on the modelled risk results is uncertain.
In this approach, positive and negative bias factors may (partly) compensate each other, while
uncertainty band factors accumulate in a non-linear way. This approach requires safety
conservative assessment of model assumptions against reality. Due to such safety conservatism
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the chance that the risk falls above and below the assessed uncertainty band is 2.5% or less and
2.5% or more, respectively.
To assess the impact of all assumptions on collision risk and to determine uncertainty bands, all
modelling assumptions except M.15 (i.e. no TCAS) are assessed in a particular sequence to take
into account dependencies [Everdij and Blom, 2002]. In case of lack of knowledge, a safety
conservative approach has been taken. For parameter value assumptions the contribution to the
uncertainty is assessed with support of model based parameter sensitivity analysis. The results
of this assessment are presented in Table 10.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
SP M.31 M.31 M.31 M.31 M.31 M.31 M.31
MP - - - - - - -
SmP - - - - - - -
NP 7× 7× 7× 7× 7× 7× 7×
CU - - - - - M.29 M.29
SU M.29 M.30a M.29 M.30a M.30b M.29 M.29 M.30b M.29 M.30b M.30a -
MU M.6b M.6b M.6b M.30a M.6b M.30a M.6b M.30a M.6b M.6b M.30a
SmU 2× 3× 2× 3× 3× 2× 2×
NU 20× 20× 20× 20× 20× 20× 20×
SO - - - - - - -
MO - - - - - - -
SmO - - - - - - -
NO 5× 5× 5× 5× 5× 5× 5×
Table 10 Overview of main results of expected effects of assumptions on the collision risk for
the various scenarios. The model assumptions are introduced in the section on modelling.
Model assumption M.15 (No TCAS) is not evaluated.
By counting the nXY’s in Table 10 and substituting this in equations (10-12) we get the results in
Figure 5 and in the last row of Table 11. To complete Table 11, we use 
Σ
Σ∗
⋅=
R
R
RR GG
*
κκ
.
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Runway combination 19R x 22
Scenarios 0−6
Figure 5 Model based risk ∑R  (o), expected risk *ΣR  (*) and uncertainty band (++), assuming No
TCAS.
Scenario 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
R*
 Coinc 2.0-10 3.3-11 1.9-10 3.1-11 3.2-11 2.6-11 2.4-11
R*
 Tower 1.3-09 7.2-10 1.2-09 6.7-10 6.8-10 1.7-10 1.6-10
R*
 Wind 2.3-09 3.8-10 2.2-09 3.5-10 3.6-10 2.9-10 2.8-10
R*
 Meteo 1.6-09 9.0-11 1.5-09 8.4-11 9.0-11 2.1-10 2.0-10
R*
 Alert 6.6-10 3.6-11 6.2-10 3.4-11 3.6-11 8.4-11 7.9-11
R*
 Mixed 5.3-08 2.9-09 0 0 0 6.7-09 0
R*
 Σ 5.9-08 4.1-09 5.7-09 1.2-09 1.2-09 7.5-09 7.4-10
Table 11 Expected collision risk *ΣR  for the scenarios, assuming No TCAS.
4.5 Comparison against risk criteria
For the SCIA operation considered, a generally accepted safety requirement does not exist.
Nevertheless, relevant comparisons can be made: 1) a comparison with the maximal JAR
allowable 10-9 of catastrophic risk per flying hour and per airborne system failure [JAR
25.1309], and 2) a comparison regarding an adequate use of SCIA to reduce the flight arrival
delay, and thus also the collision risk exposure due to reduced flying time (e.g. in the stack).
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JAR based criterion
If we assume that the average duration of a flight is two hours, then the maximal JAR allowable
catastrophic risk per flight and per airborne system failure is 2-9. If we were to adopt this
same criterion for allowing catastrophic risk per external cause then most of the individual terms
in Table 11 appear to satisfy this criterion. The exceptions are the Mixed mode terms in
scenarios 0, 1 and 5, and the Wind terms in scenarios 0 and 2. It should be noticed that any
possible effect of TCAS is not taken into account in the estimated risk values of Table 11.
ICAO based criterion
To gain further insight we express the expected extra risk in terms of the number of minutes
extra flying time that would lead to a similar risk of collision with another aircraft. The rationale
behind this is that the reason for conducting SCIA operations is to increase capacity in order to
reduce delay (= extra flying time) in the order of minutes per arrival. This reduction in flying
time itself implies a reduction in risk of collision with another aircraft (e.g. in the stack). To
gain insight into this effect we assume that the exposure of collision with another aircraft
corresponds with the TLS adopted by ICAO for fatal accidents per en-route flight hour without
taking into account TCAS. Per direction (vertical, lateral, longitudinal) the TLS is 5 ⋅10-9 fatal
accidents per flight hour [ICAO, 1998], thus for three directions this is 1.5 ⋅10-8 fatal accidents
per flighthour. Expressing the expected collision risk values of Table 11 in terms of extra flying
minutes with similar risk exposure this yields Table 12.
Scenario 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Extra flying time 236 min. 17 min. 23 min. 5    min. 5    min. 30 min. 3    min.
Table 12 Extra flying time with similar risk exposure.
This shows, if SCIA operation also reduces the flying time per arrival by 5 minutes, then under
operational scenarios 3, 4 and 6, the SCIA operation does not increase the total risk per arrival.
Practically, this means that the risk levels assessed for double MAs during SCIA operation on
runways 19R×22 do not compromise safety under the following scenarios:
• Scenario 3: Mixed mode is not allowed, AIP prescribes a left turning MA path for 22 and in
case of a double MA the ATCo instructs a turn for aircraft on 19R.
• Scenario 4: Mixed mode is not allowed, AIP prescribes a left turning MA path for 22 and in
case of a double MA the ATCo instructs an extra climb for aircraft on 19R.
• Scenario 6: Mixed mode is not allowed and AIP prescribes left turning and right turning
MA paths for runways 22 and 19R respectively.
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Mitigating measures
Although a series of operational scenarios have been assessed, there are several mitigating
measure options which have not been considered in this study, e.g.
• Mitigating measures taken such that the occurrence of key hazards is significantly reduced.
(Tower down, severe Wind, and Meteo down, in particular.)
• Training of situation-dependent handling by tower air traffic controllers.
• Increase training of pilots for non-straight MAs.
This means that the assessed risk values for conducting SCIA on 19R×22 can be further
decreased if so desired.
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5 Conclusions
The aim of the paper was to show that an accident risk modelling based evaluation of SCIA on
safety has certain advantages over the geometric methods used so far. As an illustrative
example, in this paper a risk assessment has been performed regarding simultaneous instrument
approaches on converging runway combination 19R×22 at Schiphol. In line with the accident
risk assessment methodology of [Blom et al., 2001a], the following activities have been
performed in an iterative way:
1. Identify the specific MA scenarios to be assessed, and gather information about nominal
and non-nominal behaviour of simultaneous MA by making use of information regarding
pilot and ATCo interviews, statistical analysis of various data bases and MA flight
simulations conducted by experienced pilots.
2. Develop a stochastic dynamical model of the operation, including a systematic specification
of the additional assumptions adopted.
3. Perform Monte Carlo simulations and mathematical analysis techniques to assess the
model-based accident risk for the MA scenarios identified.
4. Perform an assessment of the model assumptions and the impact each of these assumptions
has on the accident risks for each MA scenario.
5. Compare the risk results obtained for SCIA operations on runways 19R×22 to JAR and
ICAO established fatal accident risk criteria.
5.1 Conclusions regarding SCIA on 19R×22
Regarding SCIA on 19R×22 of Schiphol the main findings of the study are:
• The main contribution to the risk is coming from the non-negligible chance that, in case of a
double MA, both aircraft fly straight MA paths.
• The highest risk levels occur when simultaneous converging runway operations would be
conducted during mixed mode operations (a departure in between arrivals). Mixed mode
operations induce significantly higher double MA rates during simultaneous operations on
converging runways and therefore the extra risk is significantly higher (factor between 3 to
10) than under non mixed mode operations.
• If Mixed mode operations are not allowed, then the largest contributions to risk come from
(other) common causes such as Tower R/T blocked, severe Wind, Meteo info down and
airport great Alert. Per approach, the expected extra risk values (probability of collision) lie
between 5.7-9 and 7.4-10 (any possible effect of TCAS is not taken into account). Both
these highest and lowest values apply to operational scenarios that do not involve controller
intervention.
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The identified uncertainty band around the expected risk values extends from about a factor 6
up in risk to a factor 10 or more down in risk. These areas aim to cover 95% of all possibilities
for the risk in a conservative way. As such, 2.5% or less may be above the upper bound of the
uncertainty band, and 2.5% or more may be below the lower bound of the uncertainty band. The
main model assumptions that cause this band are:
1. ATCo of runway 22 does not instruct a turning MA (assumption M.31)
2. Expert estimated Gκα  and AIPα  values for missing a turning MA (assumption M.29,
M.30b)
3. Statistics and expert based estimates for double MA frequencies ρˆ  (assumption M.30a).
Further investigations to improve the knowledge in these areas is valuable if one likes to reduce
the bias and uncertainty band. However this would not impact the main findings above. The
evaluation of the model assumptions also shows that the impact on the expected risk of
TERPS+3 criteria regarding MA initiation points and diverging MA paths are far less important
for allowing simultaneous landings on 19R×22 at Schiphol than success rates in realizing
turning MA paths and common cause statistics are.
Under operational scenarios of excluding mixed mode operations three scenarios have been
evaluated for which the level of catastrophic risk due to double MAs under SCIA on runways
19R and 22 appeared to be lower than the ICAO [1998] allowed risk of mid-air collision during
five minutes en-route flying:
1. AIP prescribed right and left turning MA paths for runways 19R and 22 respectively
(scenario 6)
2. AIP prescribed left turning MA path for runway 22, and if necessary, an ATC instructed
right turning MA path for aircraft on runway 19R (scenario 3)
3. AIP prescribed left turning MA path for runway 22, and if necessary, an ATC instructed
extra climb of 500ft for aircraft on runway 19R (scenario 4).
Theoretically the risk levels for these scenarios are similarly small as the reduction in risk
exposure to other aircraft, e.g. due to leaving aircraft 5 minutes shorter in stack when
conducting SCIA operations on 19R×22. In view of such marginal net differences in theoretical
risk level, one might conclude that SCIA operation on 19R×22 under one of the above
mentioned three conditions does not compromise safety.
5.2 General conclusions regarding SCIA
The SCIA risk modelling study has revealed a number of issues which have not been addressed
in previous studies:
• Common cause double MAs appear far more frequently than coincidental double MAs.
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• Some of these common causes reduce the performance of ATC in a negative way, and some
the other way around.
• It has been shown that it is possible to conduct SCIA operations at risk levels that are in
healthy balance with risk criteria established by JAR and ICAO.
• The TERPS+3 criteria on the placing of the MAPt’s and the non-overlapping primary
surfaces appear to have remarkably little impact on the safety of the SCIA operation. With
the novel insight it seems worthwhile to study the development of appropriate mitigating
measures which potentially contribute to the further development of SCIA operations.
For the specific Schiphol example a reasoning has been proposed to show that SCIA does not
compromise safety; neither in relative nor in absolute terms under conditions that fall outside
the current TERPS+3 criteria for SCIA operations. For airports with frequent low ceilings it
would be valuable to relax these criteria through the adoption of the accident risk assessment
methodology discussed in this paper. For an optimal reduction of SCIA criteria a dedicated
collection of site specific statistical data on MAs and their reasons would be of great value.
Since the FAA prescribes a systematic reporting by ATC of simultaneous MA events while
conducting SCIA [FAA, 1993] one may expect that such valuable information is available. By
using this in combination with a systematic accident risk assessment modelling approach, one
might reasonably expect that the TERPS+3 criteria can be relaxed significantly on a site specific
basis; this would allow bringing into account site specifics on MA practices, probabilities of
missing MAs, and double MA frequencies.
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Acronyms and abbreviations
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCo Air Traffic Controller
ATM Air Traffic Management
DCIA Dependent Converging Instrument Approaches
DCPN Dynamically Coloured Petri Net
DH Decision Height
FMAA Final MA Altitude
FMS Flight Management System
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
ILS Instrument Landing System
JAR Joint Aviation Requirements
LNAV Lateral Navigation
MA Missed Approach
MAPt Missed Approach Point
MRVA Minimum Radar Vectoring Altitude
OM Outer Marker
PDF Probability Density Function
R/T Radio/Telephony
SCIA Simultaneous Converging Instrument Approaches
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System
TD Touchdown
TERPS Terminal Instrument Approaches
TLS Target Level of Safety
TOPAZ Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer
TWR/APP Tower/Approach
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Symbols
αAIP  Probability that a pilot forgets to make a turn during the MA as prescribed in the
AIP
αAlert Probability that the 19R controller is not successful in letting the aircraft on 19R
make a right turn in case of a double MA due to great Alert
αCoinc Probability that the 19R controller is not successful in letting the aircraft on 19R
make a right turn in case of a coincidentally double MA
αMeteo Probability that the 19R controller is not successful in letting the aircraft on 19R
make a right turn in case of a double MA due to Meteo info down
αMixed Probability that the 19R controller is not successful in letting the aircraft on 19R
make a right turn in case of a double MA due to Mixed mode operation
αTower Probability that the 19R controller is not successful in letting the aircraft on 19R
make a right turn in case of a double MA due to Tower R/T blocked
αWind Probability that the 19R controller is not successful in letting the aircraft on 19R
make a right turn in case of a double MA due to severe Wind
Gκ
α Probability that the 19R controller is not successful in letting the aircraft on 19R
make a right turn in case of MA condition κG for both aircraft
B Bias factor
Cexp 95% uncertainty band (up and down) factor
dxi, dyi , dzi Sizes of aircraft i in x, y and z-direction
dxij, dyij , dzij Mean values of the x, y and z-direction sizes of aircraft i and aircraft j
Dij Collision area of {ytij}
Dr Collision area Dij without the r-th component for r = x,y,z
f
 X Factor, with X ∈ {Considerable (C), Significant (S), Minor (M), Small (Sm),
Negligible (N)}
i, j Aircraft indices
( )wI ij ,κ Help function of κ and w defined in equation (9)
ϕij(t) Incrossing rate between aircraft i and j
),( wtijκϕ Conditional incrossing rate between aircraft i and aircraft j
K Set of aircraft types for aircraft i and j and set of double MAs due to various
reasons
K G Set of double MAs due to various reasons
K i, K j Set of aircraft types for aircraft i and aircraft j
{ κtij } Event sequence classification process for an aircraft pair (i,j)
κ i Aircraft related process representing aircraft types considered for aircraft i
Gκ Common related process representing specific MA condition for both aircraft
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G
tκ Common related process representing specific MA condition for both aircraft at
time t
)(wGκµ Conditional collision risks
nXY Total number of XY valued model assumptions, with
X ∈ {Considerable (C), Significant (S), Minor (M), Small (Sm), Negligible (N)}
Y ∈ {Pessimistic (P), Uncertain (U), Optimistic (O)}
)( 19Rwp Gκ Probability function of possible MA path for runway 19R
)( 22wp Gκ Probability function of possible MA path for runway 22
( )wp ij
ij
ij
tr
ij
t vy
,|.|
,
κ
τ
κ Conditional probability density function for the aircraft relative position and
velocity
R Collision risk between two aircraft
GRκ Model based collision risk between two aircraft for specific MA condition κ G
R Total model based collision risk (= Probability that aircraft i makes a MA on 19R
and collides with an aircraft making a MA on runway 22)
*
GRκ Expected collision risk between two aircraft for specific MA condition κ G
*
ΣR Total expected collision risk
Alertρˆ Estimated frequency for double MA due to great Alert
Coincρˆ Estimated frequency for coincidentally double MA
Meteoρˆ Estimated frequency for double MA due to Meteo info down
Mixedρˆ Estimated frequency for double MA due to Mixed mode operation
Singleρˆ Estimated frequency for single MA
Towerρˆ Estimated frequency for double MA due to Tower R/T blocked
Windρˆ Estimated frequency for double MA due to severe Wind
Gκ
ρˆ Estimated frequency of MA condition κ G for both aircraft
t Time
T End of time period
T1 MA initiation moment (i.e. Task 1)
Ti Moment at which task i starts for i = 1,2,…,9
TFMAA Transition at which aircraft reaches final Missed Approach altitude
TMA Transition at which aircraft reaches a randomly drawn altitude to start the MA.
THeight Transition at which pilot decides that aircraft has reached sufficient altitude to turn.
TReconf Transition at which aircraft reconfiguration activities are completed
TTurn Transition at which the prescribed or instructed turn is completed
τ i Stopping time for aircraft i
τ ij Stopping time for aircraft pair ( i, j )
τr
ij Stopping time for aircraft pair ( i, j )
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vt
i 3D Velocity of aircraft i approaching runway 19R
vt
j 3D Velocity of aircraft j approaching runway 22
vir,t Velocity of aircraft i in r-direction for r = x,y,z
vt
ij Relative velocity of aircraft i on runway 19R and aircraft  j on runway 22 at time t
w = (w19R, w22) MA paths on runways 19R and 22 respectively
W19R Set of two possible MA paths for runway 19R
W22 Set of two possible MA paths for runway 22
x Horizontal axis along the centerline of runway 19R, with origin at the threshold
y Axis perpendicular to the centerline of runway 19R, in the direction of runway 22,
with the origin at the threshold
yti 3D Location of aircraft i approaching runway 19R
ytj 3D Location of aircraft j approaching runway 22
yir,t Location of aircraft i in r-direction for r = x,y,z
ytij Distance between aircraft i approaching runway 19R and aircraft j approaching
runway 22 at time t
yrij Aircraft relative position without the r-th component for r = x,y,z
z Height
